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Abstract 
 
This master’s thesis develops a machine learning model for detecting Twitter bots and 
applying the model to assess if bots were used to influence the 2019 Finnish parliamentary 
election. The aim of the thesis is to contribute to the growing information systems science 
literature on the use of social media and information systems to influence voters as well as 
to increase the general awareness in Finland of the effects of bots on Twitter. 
 
The thesis relies primarily on quantitative analysis of a dataset consisting of 550,000 
unique Twitter accounts. The data was collected from Twitter during March 2019. The 
accounts in the dataset belong to humans and bots that were following 14 prominent 
Finnish politicians on Twitter. To determine which accounts are bots and to assess the 
feasibility of a new method for Twitter bot detection, a machine learning model that 
utilizes metadata-based features for classifying Twitter accounts as bots or humans is 
developed and tested on the dataset.  
 
The findings of this thesis indicate that a metadata-based approach is suitable for 
detecting bots and that there are several large botnets in the Finnish Twittersphere. Over 
30% of the 550,000 accounts are labeled as bots by the model, which implies that the 
prevalence of bots is much higher than previously suggested by Twitter’s official estimates. 
Furthermore, a majority of the accounts seem inactive and either no longer being used or 
dormant and waiting for activation. The purpose of most of the bot accounts is obscure, 
and it is not certain how many of them are following and inflating the politicians’ 
popularity on purpose. Although the bots clearly increase the visibility of certain 
politicians, the effects of the bots on Finnish political Twitter are deemed negligible.  
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Tässä pro gradu -tutkielmassa keskitytään kehittämään koneoppimismallia Twitter-
bottien havaitsemiseen ja tutkimaan mallilla pyrittiinkö koneella luotujen tilien avulla 
vaikuttamaan vuoden 2019 eduskuntavaalien tuloksiin. Tutkielman tarkoituksena on 
myötävaikuttaa kasvavaan tietojärjestelmätieteen tutkimukseen, jossa käsitellään 
sosiaalisen median ja tietojärjestelmien hyödyntämistä äänestäjiin vaikuttamisessa. 
Lisäksi tavoitteena on lisätä yleistä tietämystä bottien vaikutuksesta Twitterissä.  
 
Tutkielman keskiössä on 550,000 Twitter-tilistä koostuvan datasetin analysointi 
kvantitatiivisin menetelmin. Tutkimuksessa käytetty data louhittiin Twitteristä vuoden 
2019 maaliskuun aikana. Datasetti koostuu 14 tunnetun suomalaisen poliitikon Twitter-
seuraajista, johon kuuluu sekä botteja, että ihmisiä. Jotta datasetistä saadaan määritettyä 
mitkä tilit kuuluvat boteille ja mahdollistaakseen uuden bottienhavaitsemismenetelmän 
toimivuuden arvioimisen, tutkielmassa kehitetään koneoppimiseen perustuva malli, joka 
käyttää Twitterin metadataa määrittääkseen onko Twitter-tili ihminen vai botti.  
 
Tutkielman löydökset viittaavat, että metadataan perustuva malli kykenee tunnistamaan 
botit ja, että suomenkielisestä Twitteristä löytyy useita suuria bottiverkkoja. Mallin 
mukaan yli 30% datasetin 550,000 tileistä kuuluvat boteille, mikä viittaa bottien määrän 
olevan merkittävästi suurempi kuin mitä Twitter on virallisesti arvioinut. Lisäksi suurin 
osa näistä tileistä on epäaktiivisia mikä viittaisi niiden jo täyttäneen tarkoituksensa tai yhä 
odottavan aktivointia. Botti-tilien tarkoitus jää suurimmassa osassa tapauksista 
epäselväksi ja täten on vaikea määrittää mikä osuus niistä on tietoisesti luotu 
kasvattamaan poliitikkojen seuraajien määrä. Siitä huolimatta, että botit selvästi 
vahvistavat tiettyjen poliitikkojen näkyvyyttä, bottien olemassaolon vaikutus Suomen 
poliittiseen ympäristöön Twitterissä arvioidaan vähäiseksi. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Governments, organizations and individual people are actively attempting to persuade or 
influence the users of social media by spreading propaganda with large networks of bot 
accounts (Twitter, 2018; Nickerson & Rogers, 2014). There are multiple examples of bots 
being used to distort political discussions on Twitter in the past few years according to 
academic research, government institutions and the social media site itself. One of the most 
notable cases is the 2016 US presidential election, where an organization linked to the 
Russian government has been accused of attempting to influence the elections by using 
Twitter accounts to spread fake news or otherwise biased content (Bessi and Ferrara, 2016; 
Twitter, 2018). 
The number of academic papers investigating Twitter botnets is growing rapidly. 
Recent publications have found evidence of bots being used to influence opinions in 
countries such the United States (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016), Japan (Schäfer, Evert & 
Heinrich, 2017), Brazil (Salge & Karahanna, 2018) and Russia (Stukal et al, 2017). Similar 
studies have not been conducted in Finland but there is already evidence of at least one 
large but inactive Finnish Twitter botnet according to a researcher at F-Secure (Gallagher, 
2018; Patel, 2018). Since the 2019 Finnish parliamentary election is approaching, further 
research in this timely topic can bear interesting results. 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate how bots are being used to influence Finnish 
politics on Twitter. This thesis contributes to the growing information systems science and 
political data science literature on the use of bots and information systems to influence 
voters. Furthermore, if an active botnet is identified and the results are distributed for 
example, through an online article or post, the thesis will also have a practical contribution 
as it can potentially increase the awareness of Finnish Twitter users. 
1.2 Objectives and scope 
1.2.1 Research problem and questions 
The primary objective and research problem of this thesis is to find evidence of a Finnish 
botnet operating in Twitter and to determine whether it is used to influence or blur political 
discourse in Finland by developing and implementing a new bot detection model. The 
research questions and sub-questions are the following: 
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• Is there a Twitter botnet that can be found from analyzing the followers of popular 
Finnish politicians? 
o Do the bots tend to follow accounts that support a certain party or ideology? 
o What is the structure of the network? 
• Can a metadata-based bot detection model classify accounts with sufficient 
accuracy when compared to models that utilize both metadata and tweeting 
behavior? 
1.2.2 Scope 
The scope of the thesis is limited to the development of a model that utilizes Twitter 
metadata for bot detection and using it to analyze the number of bots that are following and 
interacting with Finnish politicians. Additionally, the networks that the bots form will be 
visualized, and basic network analysis is be applied to examine the structure. The thesis 
will not evaluate the content distributed by the bots or who or what are the individuals or 
organizations creating and operating the bots. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis starts by reviewing relevant research from the past several years on social bots, 
Twitter bots, Twitter bot detection methods and the use of Twitter for political influencing 
around the world. How the data was collected, the bot detection model developed, and the 
botnet analyzed is described in the third chapter. This will be followed by a chapter that 
describes how the model can be deployed and the results reproduced. Chapter five presents 
the results and describes the characteristics of the botnet and assesses what kind of an 
impact they have on Finnish political Twitter. Lastly, the final chapter summarizes the 
most important findings regarding the use of bots in the Finnish Twittersphere as well as 
the primary contributions and limitations of the thesis. 
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2 Literature review 
The literature review is divided into three parts. The first part will look into how previous 
research has classified bots and provides a clear definition for certain ambiguous, but 
important terms and concepts. The second part analyzes different methods that have been 
used to detect bots in Twitter related research and will provide a background and 
benchmarks for the bot detection model proposed in the methodology chapter of the thesis. 
The third and last part covers a range of literature on the use of bots in political influencing 
during the recent years to support the findings and assumptions made in the later chapters. 
2.1 Terminology and the definition of a bot 
The definition of a bot can vary quite significantly in research, news articles and other 
reports. Currently there is no clear standard for either classifying bots or categorizing 
different types of bots. Characteristics that are often used in determining whether an 
account can be labeled a bot or not include the level of automation as well as the method 
used in creating the account’s content. (Grimme et al., 2017) 
 
Figure 1. Grimme et al.’s qualitative classification of humans  
and bots and their potential influence in social media  (2017) 
Figure 1 provides a crude way to define the difference between a human user and a 
bot and illustrates how difficult it is to exactly draw a line between the two categories. In 
its most basic form, a bot is an account that is purely controlled by an unmonitored 
program. Examples of these simple bots include spambots that automatically spread 
content based on a script as well as bots belonging to like farms that are used on social 
media to increase the number of followers of an account or likes of a particular post. 
However, these are prone to detection and thus deletion. More advanced bots adjust their 
content dynamically based on the behavior of other accounts making them more difficult to 
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detect for both humans and bot detection algorithms even if the bot is still operated solely 
by a program. The most sophisticated bots are such that humans control parts of their 
activities, such as content creation, which blurs the line between the bot and human user. 
When properly operated, these hybrid bots are almost invisible to automatic detection 
mechanisms according to Grimme et al. (2017).  
2.1.1 Twitter bots 
On Twitter, bots can be divided into two types: benign and malicious (Oentaryo et 
al., 2016; Chu et al., 2012). Both of these types can include bots ranging from simple 
content sharing accounts to human-like social bots that participate in discussions and 
create original content. The primary difference is that benign bots adhere to the social 
media site’s rules and guidelines and are clearly distinguishable from human accounts 
usually by name and or a description. Conversely, malicious bots participate in activities 
that are not permitted by Twitter and rarely disclose the fact that they are operated by a 
program. Typical use cases include artificially boosting the number of followers, likes or 
retweets and directing or blurring discussions as well as spreading spam or content that 
supports a certain cause.  
A relevant subtype of Twitter bots are political bots. As the name implies, a political 
bot is specifically designed to participate in political discourse and to promote a certain 
ideology, organization or individual (Woolley 2016). In the context of political 
influencing, in most cases it can be assumed that a bot will either not have any references 
to it being a bot and it may even attempt to mimic human behavior in order to avoid 
detection and to more efficiently influence other users.  
2.1.2 Social bots 
One of the most prevalent terms in social media related bot research is the term 
social bot (Grimme et al., 2017; Ferrara et al, 2016; Woolley, 2016). There are various and 
occasionally contradictory definitions for social bots (Grimme et al., 2017). The phrase 
most commonly refers to a bot that is meant to mimic human behavior (Woolley, 2016) 
and to communicate and interact with human users (Davis et al., 2016). In contrast, a 
regular bot operates in a mechanical manner without dynamically producing content or 
engaging in discussions. Similar to the practice with Twitter bots, social bots also are 
classified as either benign or malicious.  
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2.1.3 The definition of bots in this thesis 
There are several reasons why it is important to have a specific definition for what 
can be counted as a bot and which types of bots a piece of research focuses on. First, a 
bot’s type can determine whether it is relevant for answering the research questions. 
Secondly, the bot detection algorithm described in the methodology chapter will rely on a 
set of assumptions when classifying accounts and these assumptions are based on what is 
the definition of a bot. 
In this thesis, a bot is defined as account that is either fully or partially operated by a 
program and thus, at least some parts of the account’s activities are automated. This 
includes inactive accounts, also known as sleeper bots (Woolley & Howard, 2017), which 
can be assumed to have been created automatically and that are followers of politicians or 
have liked political content. Therefore, the bots can also be classified as political bots. 
Furthermore, in most cases the term social bot may also applicable, but for the sake of 
clarity and brevity the word social is omitted. In the later sections the word bot will refer to 
the type of bots that are described in this paragraph.  
2.2 Detecting bots on Twitter 
In this section, several recent bot detection models and their features are discussed and 
evaluated based on their applicability as a basis or benchmark for the model proposed in 
the methodology part of the thesis. 
2.2.1 Simple versus complex models 
As bot detection algorithms become more advanced, so do the algorithms that control bots. 
In literature, the models range from the very simplest ones that are based on analyzing one 
piece of metadata to those that use ensemble methods and have large feature sets that use a 
mix of metadata and tweeting behavior and content data.  
Surprisingly accurate results can be obtained even with simplistic models and as an 
example Beskow and Carley (2019) managed to identify bot accounts based on a single 
piece of metadata, the profile name, with approximately 95%-99% accuracy depending on 
the algorithm used. This type of an approach results in a very narrow use and the 
aforementioned model could only detect bot accounts that have an account name 
consisting of a randomly generated string of 15 characters. However, as Beskow and 
Carley (2019) propose, a tool-box approach where multiple different models are combined 
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can make even the simple models an important contribution to more advanced bot 
detection models that combine methods from multiple papers.  
On the other end of the spectrum, in terms of sophistication and complexity, are the 
models that look into various characteristics of accounts combining metadata and behavior 
features to identify bots (Varol et al., 2017; Minnich et al., 2017). However, one notable 
issue exists that hinders the reusability of these models. Many of the models rely on some 
form on natural language processing, sentiment analysis (Davies et al, 2017) and a list of 
keywords (Minnich et al., 2017; Stukal et al., 2017; Fernquist, Kaati, & Schroeder, 2018), 
which restricts their use to a particular language and region as well as a time period or 
event such as an election due to certain themes and hashtags being important only in that 
specific context. Thus, time and effort have to be put into altering and retraining the model 
to make it accurate and applicable to research for example focusing on analyzing bot 
behavior in a country where a different language is used.  
2.2.2 Feature space selection 
Almost all models that were inspected and cited in this literature review utilize machine 
learning methods in identifying bots. Therefore, one very essential aspect of designing the 
bot detection model is determining the optimal feature space. There are two main 
considerations when selecting the features that are included. First, the features should be 
added only if they improve the accuracy of bot detection and secondly the features must 
not make the data collection phase overly time-consuming, since Twitter’s API has strict 
rate limits.  
From the models reviewed for this thesis, the most common classes of features used 
in classification of bots are metadata-based features and tweeting characteristics-based 
features (Stukal et al., 2017; Fernquist, Kaati, & Schroeder, 2018; Patel, 2018). Each user 
profile as well as tweet provides a large amount of metadata and while tweets are limited 
to a certain number of characters (280), the amount of analyses that can be performed on 
them is vast. Although other classes of features are described and used in Twitter related 
research (Varol et al., 2017; Davis et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2015), this literature review 
does not evaluate them as the metadata and tweeting characteristics classes are most 
relevant for the thesis.  
Since metadata can be obtained from both profiles and tweets, metadata-based 
features can be respectively divided into two different branches. Intuitively, metadata 
extracted from a profile gives more information on the account, while metadata from 
Literature review 7  
 
 
tweets gives a combination of information from the profile posting it as well as the tweet 
itself (Wang et al., 2015). Most models seem to use only one of these, which is most likely 
to streamline the data mining process and to avoid having to combine two datasets with 
overlapping data.  
Examples of metadata that can be extracted from Twitter include all basic profile 
information such as name, description and number of friends. Simple and commonly used 
features include checks on whether a list of different pieces of profile information are 
blank or at default resulting in binary features such as whether or not the profile picture has 
been added (Stukal et al., 2017; Patel, 2018), with the more fields that are left at default, 
the more likely it is that the profile is a bot. Data on the number of users that the profile is 
following, the number of followers and ratios of these are also often used (Stukal et al., 
2017; Fernquist, Kaati, & Schroeder, 2018; Patel, 2018; Wang et al., 2015) and an example 
of a suspicious profile is such that it has none or only a few followers, but it follows many. 
Lastly, the contents of the textual metadata can be analyzed and used to classify bots for 
instance by inspecting the length or frequency of certain keywords in the description or 
name (Beskow and Carley, 2019; Fernquist, Kaati, & Schroeder, 2018; Patel, 2018).   
Features based on tweeting characteristics are more difficult to compare and contrast 
than those based on metadata due to the variations in approaches used in different models. 
Furthermore, they include more event or theme related aspects, particularly when assessing 
the use of keywords that are related to campaigns or social media phenomena (Stukal et al., 
2017; Fernquist, Kaati, & Schroeder, 2018). However, a certain group of features that 
belong to this class can be found in multiple models and these include the number hashtags 
in tweets, number of URLs in tweets and number of retweets (Stukal et al., 2017; Wang et 
al., 2015; Chen et al., 2017).  
Earlier findings suggest that a combination of both metadata and content features 
yields optimal results (Fernquist, Kaati, & Schroeder, 2018, Bessi and Ferrara 2016). There 
are hundreds of different features that can be derived from Twitter’s metadata and content 
data, making it a matter of preference on which ones to choose as various combinations 
have resulted in highly accurate results. Furthermore, some of the analyses used to create 
content-based features can be applied to metadata-based features as well to create new 
ones. Examples of this include counting the number of hashtags, URLs and instances of 
specified keywords in the name or description of an account. 
The model proposed in this thesis will utilize metadata-based features only and 
therefore, they are examined more thoroughly than content-based and other types of 
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features. Table 1 illustrates some of the features that have been used in the papers 
mentioned in the literature review (Fernquist et al., 2018, Stukal et al., 2017; Varol et al., 
2017; Wang et al., 2015). Unsurprisingly, the most common features are the ones that are 
directly related to how Twitter functions, with the number of followers, friends, tweets and 
retweets being examples of these. There are no standard naming conventions and 
consequently the same features may have slightly different names depending on the 
author’s preferences.  
Table 1: Metadata-based feature types and examples 
 
Binary features Profile information features Ratio features 
Metadata content 
features 
Defaults: 
- Profile image 
- Background image 
- No user description 
 
Other: 
- Profile verified 
- Location specified 
- No friends 
- No tweets 
General: 
- Number of followers 
- Number of friends 
- Number of tweets 
- Number of likes 
- Age of account 
- Account language 
 
Length: 
- Profile name 
- Profile description 
Activity:  
- Ratio of following and 
followers (FE/FI) 
- Reputation (FE/(FI + FE)) 
- Given likes per friend 
- Given likes per follower 
 
Account age: 
-Friends/Account age 
- Following rate (FI/AU) 
Bot check:  
- Name contains bot 
- Description contains 
bot 
 
Other content: 
- Number of # in 
description 
- Keywords in 
description 
- URL(s) in description 
 
* FI = Number of following, FE = Number of followers, AU = Age of account 
In Table 1, the features are grouped into four different types. Some of the most 
commonly used features are found in the first group that is labeled as binary features. 
Based on the popularity, it can be assumed that they are appropriate for the detection of bot 
accounts despite of their simplicity. More specifically, binary features designed to check 
which profile customization options such as the profile image and background image, are 
left at default are found in many models (Fernquist et al., 2018, Stukal et al., 2017; Varol 
et al., 2017). This seems to imply that leaving the profile settings to default and 
personalization to minimal is a common practice despite of it making the bot easier to 
detect by humans and machines.  
The second group also contains many of the most prevalent features in bot detection 
models. These are mostly numerical characteristics, many of which are related to how 
popular a Twitter user is and how actively it is used. Particularly, the number of followers, 
friends, tweets, retweets and likes are frequently used (Fernquist et al., 2018; Varol et al., 
2017; Wang et al., 2015). Another commonly used feature is the length of the description, 
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which cannot be obtained directly from Twitter, but can be calculated easily from the 
metadata (Stukal et al., 2017; Varol et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2015). 
The third group of features are ratios that can be obtained from the same metadata as 
many of the profile information features of the 2nd group. When compared to the two 
previous groups, the ratio features contain more variety as they are not based on Twitter’s 
built-in attributes. A common ratio features that can be found in many papers is the 
followers-to-friends ratio (Stukal et al., 2017; Fernquist et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2015). In 
the model created by Fernquist, Kaati, and Schroeder (2018) the top 10 features include 
multiple of ratios, with examples being given likes per friend (#1), followers-friends ratio 
(#2) and number of likes per followers (#10). 
The last group consists of the features that are based on the contents of the different 
attributes. Features in this group are less commonly used and vary significantly per model. 
Two of the features in this list simply check whether or not an account is a bot according to 
the profile description or name (Beskow and Carley, 2019). The rest of the features are 
more complex, and they are used for example to look for URLS, hashtags or other 
keywords (Wang et al., 2015) that can be linked to bot accounts based on heuristics or 
previous research. 
Since the performance of each individual feature is not always included in articles 
related to Twitter bot detection, evaluating the best alternatives requires testing. Models 
can perform well with both small and large numbers of features (Beskow and Carley, 
2019; Fernquist et al., 2018). Since ratio features were proven to be among the best 
performing features in some cases (Fernquist et al., 2018) and they are widely used (Stukal 
et al., 2017; Fernquist et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2015), several of them will be included in 
the model introduced in the methodology chapter. The reason for the ratio features’ 
popularity is probably a result of the fact that they essentially capture more information 
than the underlying attributes and the possible features created from them. Selecting the 
other metadata features is more difficult as there is considerable variation by article on 
what are the best performing ones. Therefore, initially as many as possible should be 
included and tested and the results reported before removing the redundant features.   
2.2.3 Classification methods 
Bots have been evolving rapidly during the past few years up to the point that they may be 
difficult even for a human to distinguish them from real users (Ferrara et al., 2016). 
Previously, simple supervised machine learning models could identify accounts with 
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unnatural tweeting volumes or robotic tweeting schedules and were sufficient for keeping 
the number of bot accounts low (Ferrara et al., 2016). Because Twitter, like most of social 
media sites, attempts to actively detect and disable bot accounts, the creators of bots have 
responded by making bots behave more like humans. Consequently, the selection of 
features as well as preparing the training data has become more demanding and for a 
model to stay up to date, feature engineering and adding new training datasets is needed 
(Yang, Varol, Davis, Ferrara, Flammini, & Menczer, 2019). 
During the past few years both supervised (Stukal et al., 2017; Beskow and Carley, 
2019) and unsupervised (Minnich et al, 2017; Chavoshi, Hamooni, & Mueen, 2016) 
machine learning models have been used in bot detection research. The drawback of 
supervised learning has been that creating a labeled dataset for training the model either 
requires a large amount of manual labeling (Stukal et al., 2017) or using a prelabeled 
dataset, which may limit the capabilities of the model as the datasets most likely represent 
only a fraction of the possible behavior of bot accounts in Twitter. Another argument that 
supports the use of unsupervised learning is that these models can detect novel bot 
behavior that may get past a supervised model (Minnich et al., 2017), which can only 
detect bots that are similar enough to the dataset that was used to train it. However, the 
results of unsupervised models are more difficult to validate due to the absence of labeled 
data. 
One of the reasons for supervised models being used is that they are better suited for 
analyzing topical datasets that are collected from Twitter’s streaming API (Stukal et al., 
2017). Twitter’s API allows performing searches and collecting the data on tweets that 
contain for certain keywords or hashtags, which is particularly useful when analyzing 
political discourse that is related to a specific topic, such as an election (Fernquist, Kaati, 
& Schroeder, 2018; Neuder, Kollanyi, & Howard, 2017). Since campaigns, political 
parties, candidates and users use hashtags to make their tweets visible when commenting 
on specific topic, it is more efficient to mine data on a topical level with the keyword 
search instead of first collecting a large dataset of Twitter accounts and then analyzing the 
content of their tweets.  
Table 2 contains information on the algorithms used, numbers of features and 
performances of a collection of the models discussed in the literature review. There are 
considerable differences between the models particularly in the number of features used, as 
well as in the algorithm of choice. In most cases the random forest algorithm is 
recommended (Fernquist, Kaati, & Schroeder, 2018), but based on this sample other 
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algorithms should be tested as well. It should be noted that the models cannot be directly 
compared with each other since there are differences in the use cases.  
Table 2: Models, features, algorithms and performance 
Model by Algorithm Features Accuracy Precision  Recall F1 
Beskow & Carley 
(2019) 
Log. 
regression 1 0.996 0.994 0.997 0.996 
Davis et al. (2016) Custom 1150 0.734 0.471 0.208 0.288 
Fernquist et al. 
(2018) 
Random 
forest 140 0.957 0.941 0.976 0.958 
Stukal et al. (2017) 
Ridge log. reg. 
42 
- 0.99 0.77 0.866 
SVM - 0.92 0.87 0.894 
Ensemble - 0.99 0.77 0.866 
Minnich et al. 
(2017) Custom 130 - 0.90 - - 
* If information is unavailable the field is marked “-“ 
2.2.4 Detecting the right bots  
As stated in the previous section of the literature review, not all bots are malicious or 
relevant for this type of research. Twitter allows the use of bots under certain limitations, 
which has resulted in a large number of non-malicious bots being used for curating and 
distributing information by organizations as well as individuals (Oentaryo et al., 2016). A 
practice used by several models to ignore these accounts is to ignore Twitter users which 
use the word bot either in their name of profile.  
Furthermore, not all malicious bots that like or retweet political posts or follow 
politicians are political bots by design. As an example, Gallagher (2018) points out that the 
Finnish botnet discovered by Patel (2018) seems to be following individuals on Twitter 
based on the recommended profiles that the platform offers when creating an account. 
Since politicians are often popular and visible users in Twitter, these bots received them as 
recommendations. As a result, these bots will become false positives in a model that is 
designed to look for political bots. 
2.3 Use of bots in political influencing 
2.3.1 Evidence and examples 
The paper closest to this thesis geographically and timewise is a study done on 
political bots in the Swedish general election in September 2018. Although the amount of 
bot activity was negligible at only 5% of all election related content during the monitoring 
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period, it is still unsettling and suggests further research may be valuable. The paper does 
not discuss what are the most likely culprits behind the bots, but it does draw the 
conclusion that the bots were more actively participating in discussions with right-wing 
users and the most followed bots were also skewed towards the right. (Fernquist, Kaati, & 
Schroeder, 2018) 
The results from two papers that monitored bot activity in Germany during a state 
parliament as well as federal presidential election (Neudert, 2017) and federal election 
during 2017 (Mortatter et al., 2018) are similar to those from Sweden’s general election of 
2018. Bots represented around 7 - 11% of the accounts and bot-driven content represented 
7.4 – 9% of all traffic during the German elections (Mortatter et al., 2018; Fernquist, Kaati, 
& Schroeder, 2018). These are modest numbers and in line with Twitter’s estimate of bots 
accounting for approximately 10% of activity. The main reason for concern is that the bot 
activity was skewed towards supporting the alt-right movement and was possibly produced 
by accounts outside of Germany (Mortatter et al., 2018).  
Stukal, Sanovich, Bonneua and Tucker’s (2017) findings on bots in Russian political 
Twitter are far beyond those of any other papers discussed in this thesis in terms of the 
magnitude of bot created content. According to the article, up to 85% of the daily tweets 
containing political keywords were posted by bot accounts during 2014-2015. This is not 
overly surprising as the target country, Russia, differs from the other examples that are all 
from Western democracies.  
Based on the findings of multiple papers and studies, there is evidence of Twitter-
based computational propaganda being used across the world by organizations and 
governments (Woolley & Howard, 2017). There are regional differences in both the 
prevalence of bot accounts as well as in their activeness (Woolley & Howard, 2017), and 
based on this sample it could be assumed that if Finland is similar to other geopolitically 
unpowerful and small states, there will be low levels of bot activity. However, the current 
growth of Euroscepticism and rise of right-wing political movements alongside Finland’s 
historical relations and proximity to Russia may provide a more fertile foundation for bot 
activity than for example Sweden.  
2.3.2 Goals of political bots 
Measuring the successfulness of political bots is difficult as it is hard to quantify the 
impact that they have had for example on voting behavior (Bjola, 2018). This is partially 
due to the difficulty of determining causality as voters are constantly influenced by 
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multiple different sources. Nevertheless, the prevalence of computational propaganda 
campaigns would suggest that they are viewed as a functional tool that does have an effect 
on the target audience (Bjola, 2018).  
There are several different hypothesized goals that the creators of bots are trying to 
reach. These range from high level goals such as increasing the partisanship of a 
population or advancing a cause that the creator of the bots supports. Bjola (2018) suggests 
that one of the reasons for governments to participate in creation and distribution of digital 
propaganda is that “it is an effective non-military means for achieving political and 
strategic goals”.  
More measurable and easily achievable targets include manipulating the popularity 
and visibility of tweets by liking, following and retweeting content with a botnet. These 
methods can cause a particular hashtag to trend thus pushing it higher into the feeds of 
other Twitter users. Other goals may be to make an opinion seem more popular than it 
actually is or to bury actual discussions or factual information making it difficult to follow. 
Concrete examples of use cases include spamming pro-government tweets or flooding 
search results related to protests with meaningless content making it more difficult for 
human users to find and participate in discussions with each other (Suárez-Serrato et al., 
2016).   
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3 Methodology 
This chapter describes the methodology used to answer the research questions. The 
chapter is divided into three main sections which describe the collection of the data, the 
creation of the bot detection algorithm and how the network analysis was conducted. In 
each of the sections, the tools and activities related to the task are described.  
Figure 2 below shows the main steps of the process and the tools used in each phase. 
The first step of the process is to select a sample of politicians with active Twitter accounts 
that have as many followers as possible. The second step is to download all metadata from 
the profiles of these politicians’ followers. This creates a large dataset consisting of Twitter 
accounts and their metadata. The third step is to clean and reshape the data for the machine 
learning algorithm. Between the third and fourth step various features and algorithms are 
tested in order to develop the bot detection model. In the fourth step, the finished bot 
detection model is used on the dataset to create a new dataset consisting only of bot 
accounts. In the fourth step this data set is analyzed in various ways until finally in the last 
step it is reformatted and visualized. 
 
Figure 2. Process map  
3.1 Collecting the data from Twitter 
This thesis tests an unorthodox approach to collecting Twitter data as the dataset is 
compiled from individual accounts’ followers instead of the more common method where 
all tweets (and associated account metadata) that use specific hashtags or keywords are 
gathered through Twitter’s Streaming API. This method is appropriate since the proposed 
bot detection model only requires metadata. The benefits of this approach include that it 
allows detecting both dormant bots as well as those that do not use specific hashtags or 
words that the streaming method queries for. The primary drawback is that analyzing the 
intentions or goals of the botnet is mainly limited to identifying amplification attempts, or 
1. Data selection 2. Data collection 3. Data wrangling 4. Bot detection 4. Analysis 5. Visualization
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in other words measuring the amount of bot followers that specific accounts have and 
seeing how much content these bots are producing. 
3.1.1 Tools 
The primary tools used in data collection and formatting phase were the statistical 
programming language R and its “rtweet” package, which is a “R client for accessing 
Twitter’s REST and stream APIs” (Kearney, 2018). Additionally, the “tidyverse” library 
and packages included in it were used in cleaning the data.  
3.1.2 Selecting the data 
Selecting which politicians’ followers to inspect for bot activity is a critical choice for the 
results of the thesis, since the percentage of bots compared to real users as well as 
interpretations on whether the bots are influencing the discussions under right-wing or left-
wing politicians are highly dependent on the dataset that is analyzed. In other words, if the 
sample that is taken happens to have a particularly disproportionate amount of bot activity 
or is otherwise skewed, consequently the results will most likely also be misleading. As a 
further complication, many Finnish politicians do not own a Twitter account and those that 
do, usually have only a modest number of followers, which makes it difficult to obtain 
equal amounts of data on all parties. These limitations will be accounted for by taking an 
as comprehensive as possible sample and by not making overly broad conclusions or 
inferences regarding the whole Finnish political Twittersphere in the findings and 
conclusions chapters.  
It should be noted that this method results in the collected dataset being essentially a 
snapshot from March 2019. Consequently, the results are likely to be different if the study 
is repeated at a later point in time, since there is a possibility that the bot activity intensifies 
as the election day gets closer. Additionally, some of the users studied now may be 
identified by Twitter as bots and deleted. This creates a possibility for further studies as it 
can be monitored how effectively Twitter identifies the bots detected by this thesis and 
removes them.  
The profiles were selected based on several heuristically chosen criteria to ensure 
that as many political parties as possible were represented and that a sufficient amount of 
data was collected. At least one member of parliament was taken from each of the current 
coalition parties as well as from all parties that have a support of over 5%, however with a 
maximum of two per party. Furthermore, only accounts with over five thousand followers 
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were picked. Lastly, some prominent politicians with over 10k followers were selected 
even if they do not match the other criteria as several influential political figures would 
otherwise be excluded. Table 3 shows the politicians that were selected and whose 
followers’ data was mined. 
Table 3: Selected politicians  
Name Political party Username Followers (K)* 
Alexander Stubb National Coalition Party @alexstubb 370 
Sauli Niinistö National Coalition Party @niinisto 159 
Juha Sipilä Centre Party @juhasipila 126 
Anne Berner Centre Party @AnneBerner 21.7 
Pekka Haavisto Green League @Haavisto 130 
Ville Niinistö Green League @VilleNiinisto 84.3 
Paavo Arhinmäki Left Alliance @paavoarhinmaki 109 
Li Andersson Left Alliance @liandersson 76.5 
Antti Rinne Social Democratic Party @AnttiRinnepj 25.6 
Sanna Marin Social Democratic Party @MarinSanna 14.3 
Jussi Halla-aho Finns Party @Halla_aho 14.5 
Laura Huhtasaari Finns Party @LauraHuhtasaari 13.7 
Sampo Terho Blue Reform @SampoTerho 7.6 
Paavo Väyrynen Seven Star Movement @kokokansanpaavo 10 
*Number of followers at March 2019 
The sample consists of 14 different politicians from 8 different parties ranging from 
liberal to conservative and left-wing to right-wing. These include the current president and 
three ministers as well as 6 party leaders. Many of the small parties were left out by this 
approach, but simultaneously their politicians did not have accounts or had much fewer 
followers, which reduced the impact that their exclusion could have had on the results. The 
number of Twitter accounts whose data was collected totaled over 1.1 million, but it was 
reduced down to a bit above 550000 after duplicates were removed. The duplicates were a 
result of the fact that many Twitter users were following multiple selected politicians.  
3.1.3 Data wrangling 
The rtweet package’s lookup_users method returns 88 variables, which includes both 
metadata and other data, such as information related to the most recent tweet made by the 
user. Most of these variables are unnecessary for the model and after removing the unused 
and non-metadata related columns, the table is left with less than 15 variables. 
Additionally, some of the columns were renamed according to the features that they 
represent to add clarity. Other changes that were made to the datasets are described in the 
Methodology 17  
 
 
next section as they are more closely related to the feature engineering phase. The used 
scripts and a sample view of the collected data can be found in appendices A and B. 
3.2 Implementation of the bot detection algorithm on the dataset 
This section starts by briefly describing how the dataset was further formatted and what 
were the packages used in the machine learning model. The second part focuses on the 
process used to create the bot detection model, which was divided into two steps with both 
of them containing a different version of the model. The goal of the first step was to assess 
the overall feasibility of using metadata to classify bots and to support the creation of a 
new training dataset for the second version of the model. The second version of the model 
was refined by adding new features and by being trained with the new training data. Lastly, 
final part of this section describes how the second version was used on the 550,000 
accounts to create a final dataset consisting only of bots. 
3.2.1 Preparing the data 
Further manipulations to the dataset were made to create new attributes to support the 
binary and ratio features. The binary features were calculated from corresponding 
attributes where a setting left at default or blank equals 1. The ratio features were created 
similarly by calculating the values from the profile information metadata and then placed 
into new columns. Ratio calculations that resulted in NaN (not a number) or Inf (infinite), 
were replaced with a zero. Lastly, redundant attributes were removed.  
3.2.2 Tools 
The bot detection model was built with the statistical programming language R by using 
caret (Kuhn, 2008), a machine learning library. Caret was chosen since it allows 
experimenting with machine learning algorithms from different packages and provides a 
unified process and syntax for all tasks from data preparation to model evaluation.  
3.2.3 First version of the bot detection model 
Based on the findings of previous research and datasets available for training the 
model, a selection of 11 features were picked for testing the first version of the model. The 
feature space consists of four binary features, four profile information features and three 
ratio features that can be seen in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Features included in the first version of the model 
Binary features Profile information features Ratio features 
Default profile image 
No banner 
No user description 
No location 
Number of followers 
Number of friends 
Number of tweets 
Number of likes  
Followers / Friends 
Likes / Followers 
Likes / Friends 
 
 
The model was trained with the cresci-2017 dataset (Cresci et al., 2017), which 
contains over 13000 labeled accounts divided into groups of social spambots, traditional 
spambots, fake followers and genuine accounts. The dataset was formatted to have the 
same attributes as described in Table 4. Lastly, the training dataset was balanced including 
3000 randomly sampled bot accounts and 3000 randomly sampled genuine accounts.  
To find a suitable algorithm for the model, the LDA, CART, KNN, SVM and 
Random Forest algorithms were tested. Out of these Random Forest performed the best, 
although there were signs of either the training data not representing the variety of real data 
or that the model being overfitted as the accuracy was over 97% or 98% on most runs. This 
issue was ignored as the model was deemed sufficiently accurate for the first phase where 
the goal was mainly to make the manual validation of the results quicker by creating a list 
of potential bot accounts. The model was then tested on a sample of 5000 accounts from 
the dataset that was collected for this thesis.  
After manually inspecting on Twitter the accounts that the model labeled as bots, it 
was evident that the model had difficulties distinguishing bots and genuine accounts. 
Particularly accounts which were apparently created by people trying out Twitter without 
becoming active users were prone to being labeled as bots due to the behavior being 
similar. In most cases, the easily distinguishable bots were following approximately 20-
100 accounts, had 0-2 followers and little to no tweets, retweets or likes. 
3.2.4 Creating a new training dataset 
Based on the performance of the first version of the model, it was apparent that the cresci-
2017 dataset was unsuitable for training a model that could accurately distinguish bots 
from humans based on metadata. A possible explanation is that the training data had only 
very clear examples of bots and genuine accounts, where the behavior in terms of tweets, 
retweets, likes and ratios of followers and following differed widely depending on whether 
the account was a bot or not. This does not reflect the actual behavior of accounts where in 
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some cases even with quantitative and qualitative assessment it is difficult to label an 
account accurately as either a bot or a human.  
By manually labeling a set of accounts from the dataset consisting of followers of the 
Finnish politicians, a new training dataset that represents the actual distribution and 
behavior of the accounts of the target dataset was created. This was done by checking and 
verifying the accuracy of 2000 accounts predicted to be bots by the first model. The results 
were that out of these accounts 1336 were accurately labeled as bots, as they were either 
bots or accounts exhibiting extremely bot like behavior while 664 were actually humans or 
accounts which were impossible to determine as belonging to either group.  
A qualitative approach was employed for classifying the accounts as either bots or 
humans. The process used in labeling the accounts is illustrated in Figure 3. The 
classification started by inspecting the profile information of the account. Common signs 
of a bot were the name or description of the account, which often included Russian or 
Arabic and or a seemingly random string of characters and numbers coupled with the 
account following 21 other Twitter users, which is the default number of recommended 
users to follow given by Twitter when creating a new account. Other possible predictors 
included in this step are the profile image and banner as well as the age of the account. As 
a second step the tweets and retweets were checked when available to see what kind of 
activity the account has and what other accounts it interacts with. As the third step, the 
accounts that the possible bot was following were inspected to find discrepancies. For 
example, a user following mainly seemingly random foreign accounts coupled with one 
Finnish politician or if it was following exactly 21 very popular Finnish accounts were 
usually the best predictors of an accurate classification as a bot even though the machine 
learning model could not look for these.  
 
Figure 3. Framework for qualitative classification of bots  
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If after the three first steps the account was still too ambiguous for classification, the 
likes and followers were checked for bot like behavior. In Figure 3, randomness implies 
the entropy of some behavior. An example of this would be an account that follows only 
Finnish content but likes content that is in a foreign language and not at all in line with the 
other characteristics of the account.  
During this process several interesting findings were made, which can be used later 
in the analysis of the whole dataset. Firstly, most of the bot accounts were dormant as well 
as possibly a part of follower boosting operation. Secondly, most of the bots were difficult 
to label as political bots as it is not sure whether they were created to boost the followers of 
a particular politician or if it followed them by coincidence based on Twitter’s 
recommendations. Common shared characteristics among bots included that they barely 
engaged with content or interacted with other users and that they followed a random group 
of 21 accounts, which most likely are those suggested by Twitter during the creation of the 
account (Patel, 2018; Gallagher 2018). Peculiar accounts that they often followed included 
less well-known US politicians, an obscure game called Growtopia and a niche Finnish 
newspaper called Markkintointi and Mainonta. These findings and their implications to the 
model will be analyzed and discussed further in later parts of the thesis. 
3.2.5 Improving the bot detection model 
The second version of the bot detection model differed from the previous one mainly in 
how the splitting of the training and validation data was done, what parameters and 
algorithms were used as well as how many features were included.  
New features could be added to the second version of the model as the training data 
was no longer a limiting factor. By including the age of the account, and two ratio features 
derived from comparing the profile information to the age of the account, the number of 
features was increased from 11 to 14. The new feature set is shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Features included in the second version of the model 
Binary features Profile information features Ratio features 
Default profile image 
No banner 
No user description 
No location 
Number of followers 
Number of friends 
Number of tweets 
Number of likes 
Age of account 
Followers / Following 
Likes / Followers 
Likes / Following 
Following / Age of account 
Likes / Age of account  
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Several variants of the Random Forest algorithm were tested, but the standard 
version still performed optimally and was selected for the final model. The model was 
trained with a randomly sampled set of 500 bots and 500 humans from the new manually 
labeled dataset. The remaining 1000 were used in the validation of the performance. The 
final version of the bot detection model has an accuracy of 83% with only slight changes 
after multiple runs and small variations in parameter settings. Table 6 below lists the most 
important statistics for assessing the performance. 
Table 6: Performance of the bot detection model 
Metric Value 
Accuracy  
Recall 
Specificity 
0.837 
0.846 
0.793 
 
 
In terms of feature importance, the top features were a mix of profile information and ratio 
features, while the binary features were all in the bottom half of the feature ranking. The 
model gives much weight to the number of accounts that an account is following, since the 
two top features are related to the following attribute. This is somewhat problematic for the 
overall goal of the thesis as it implies that the model is best at detecting dormant bots and 
bots belonging to follower farms. These accounts can be political bots, but in many cases 
determining if they are following politicians on purpose or by coincidence is difficult. This 
is due to the fact that politicians often appear on the top of the recommended accounts to 
follow in Finland, which makes them prone to attracting bots.  
Table 7: Features ranked 
Rank Feature Importance 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Following 
Following to age of account 
Age of account 
Followers to following 
Likes to following 
Tweets 
Likes to age of account 
Followers 
Default profile image 
Likes 
No description 
No location 
No banner 
Likes to followers 
100.00 
61.00 
56.57 
22.87 
15.68 
15.18 
11.95 
10.05 
7.11 
6.34 
4.72 
3.61 
2.56 
0.00 
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3.2.6 Implementation 
To implement the bot detection algorithm, the dataset consisting of the 558,983 
followers of the 14 Finnish politicians was formatted to match the training dataset. The 
model predicted that out of the dataset approximately 36.6% are bots. Since the model’s 
accuracy is 83%, out of the 204,426 accounts classified as bots it can be assumed that 
169,673 should be the real number of bots when not taking into consideration the accounts 
labeled as humans that in reality are bots.  
To ensure that the analysis is conducted on accounts that are true positives, or in this 
case bots labeled as bots, an additional measure is taken to subset the 204,426 accounts. 
During the manual validation phase several initial findings were made regarding the 
characteristics of typical bots within the dataset. By querying the dataset containing the 
prediction results with additional search criteria, such as if the account is following 
Growtopia or exactly 21 other accounts, new groups which have a much higher likely hood 
of being true positives could be formed. Although these accounts may not be purely 
political bots, their existence in the Finnish political Twitter sphere merits investigating 
them.  
Based on the validation phase, four main groups of bots were identified. Three of 
these groups are related to a bot’s behavior in following other accounts, with the first being 
the bots following 21 other accounts. The second group is bots following Growtopia and 
the third is bots following Markkinointi & Mainonta (M&M). The fourth group is bots that 
have Cyrillic or Arabic writing in the profile, which also may indicate where their creators 
are located. The groups are not mutually exclusive and there were occasional examples of 
bots belonging to two or three of them. Appendix C contains examples of each bot type. 
Later in the thesis the primary focus will be on analyzing these new groups of bots and the 
fifth chapter will describe the main findings and results. 
3.3 Network analysis  
3.3.1 Tools 
The network analysis was completed with R and Gephi, an open-source network 
exploration and visualization tool. In R, the bot dataset was split into four separate data 
tables based on the groups they belong to. In the four new datasets, each row represents an 
edge and contains the name of the bot account and the Twitter name of the politician that it 
is following. The bot networks in each dataset were then analyzed, clustered and graphed 
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in Gephi. In the network graph, each node is an account that belongs either to a politician 
or a bot. Edges have a weight of one and indicate which politicians a bot node is following. 
To highlight the politicians’ accounts in the network graph, their nodes have titles with a 
font size related to how many edges are directed towards the node. 
3.3.2 Analysis 
To numerically analyze the networks and to cluster them, the modularity of the networks 
and weighted degree of the nodes were calculated in Gephi. Table 8 shows the 
characteristics and modularity of the networks as well as the average weighted degree of 
nodes within the network.  
Table 8: Network characteristics 
Network Nodes Edges Modularity Avg. Weighted degree 
Following 21 2827 6749 0.245 2.518 
Following M&M 36851 120952 0.222 3.282 
Following Growtopia 11051 21391 0.288 2.387 
Russian & Arabic 
language bots 13623 34299 0.364 1.936 
 
 
Further analysis was done in R, where for example the percentage of bots in each 
politicians’ list of followers was calculated and the relationships between the number of 
bots and different characteristics of the politicians’ accounts were scrutinized.  
3.3.3 Visualizations 
The network visualizations were created using Gephi. To create the layout of the graphs, 
the OpenOrd and ForceAtlas2 algorithms were applied consecutively. By applying the 
algorithms to the network graphs, they became easier to inspect and evaluate visually. The 
graphs were colored based on the community structures detected via the modularity 
measure. It should be noted that the colors are not related to the political party or 
ideological leaning of the politicians. The goal of the visualization phase was to help visual 
analysis and to find interesting structures, which could later be evaluated numerically. The 
four network graphs can be seen in Figures 4-7 in the following pages. The findings of the 
analysis are discussed in the fifth chapter of the thesis. Larger and higher definition 
versions of the network graphs can be found by following the link in appendix D.  
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Figure 4. Network graph of the bots following 21 other accounts 
 
 
Figure 5. Network graph of the bots following Markkinointi & Mainonta 
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Figure 6. Network graph of the bots following Russian and Arabic accounts 
 
 
Figure 7. Network graph of the bots following Growtopia 
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4 Experiment 
This chapter describes the setup of the experiment used to obtain the results of the thesis 
and can be used to test and replicate the findings.  More specifically, this chapter lists the 
model parameters and the correct steps required to format and clean data so that the model 
can be used with the provided or any other similar datasets. The code and links to the 
datasets and R script can be found in appendices E and F. 
4.1 Required libraries 
In order to run the code, the caret, tidyverse and naniar packages in R are required. 
Additionally, in the supporting scripts the libraries zoo, e1071 and gtools were utilized or 
tested, but they are not required when running only the bot detection model. 
4.2 Formatting data 
The data is stored in data tables and the correct format for each column can be found from 
Table 9 below. Furthermore, when adding new features, binary data should be turned into 
factors in order for the model to correctly evaluate them while all other data can be stored 
in the numeric format whether they are integers or floats. The only exception of is the 
screen name column that contains characters and is removed before entering data into the 
model and returned after running the algorithm. 
Table 9: Formatting columns 
Feature: followers following tweets likes age of account 
Type: numeric numeric numeric numeric numeric 
Feature: followers to following 
likes to 
following 
likes to 
followers 
likes to age of 
account 
friends to age 
of account 
Type: numeric numeric numeric numeric numeric 
Feature: no banner no location no description screen name bot 
Type: factor factor factor factor factor 
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4.3 Model parameters 
All parameters described refer to the corresponding ones in the caret package. The metric 
used in the bot detection model is “Accuracy”. The modes and values used in the train 
function are the following. The resampling method is “repeatedcv” and the 10-fold cross 
validation is repeated 10 times, meaning that the data is split into ten parts and the model is 
trained on 9/10 of the data, while the last 1/10 is used for validation. This process is then 
repeated ten times with different ways of splitting the data in each iteration. Lastly, the 
search argument is set at “grid”, which is the default setting.  
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5 Results and discussion 
In this section the key findings of the thesis as well as the results of the different analyses 
performed on the data are discussed. The chapter is divided into two parts starting with the 
findings related to the groups of bots followed by an assessment of the botnets’ potential to 
impact Finnish political Twitter.  
5.1 Findings 
5.1.1 Bots in Finnish political Twitter 
Overall, the findings of the thesis do not support the notion that Finland and Finnish 
politics would be the target of internal or external bot influencing campaign. There are two 
possible explanations for this. The first alternative is that the metadata-based model is 
inefficient or incapable of detecting social bots, which is a category to which most modern 
political bots belong to. The other explanation is that there is no error in the design of the 
model and/or that there are not many political bots in the Finnish Twittersphere. The latter 
is line with a very recent announcement made by Supo, the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service, which stated that it has not found evidence of foreign entities attempting to 
influence the elections (Simojoki, 2019).  
Although this announcement omits commenting on the possibility of internal 
attempts to influence political discussions online, it can still be seen as probable that local 
organizations or individuals would not utilize Twitter when attempting to influence 
elections. This is based on the fact that the social media site is not very popular or widely 
used and some estimates suggest that only about five to ten percent of the Finnish have at 
some point created a Twitter account. This would mean that there are only 275,000 to 
550,000 Finnish Twitter profiles assuming that each individual has created only one 
account (Statcounter, 2019; Isotalus et al., 2018). Furthermore, of these accounts it has 
been estimated that only 50,000 are active users (Isotalus et al., 2018), which suggests that 
Twitter is not a viable platform when trying to reach and influence wide audiences in 
Finland. 
Despite of there being few clear political bots, there are possibly over 150,000 
identified bot accounts following Finnish politicians on Twitter according to the bot 
detection model. As was stated in the methodology chapter, four primary groups of bots 
were identified and analyzed. Although these bot accounts do not interact much with other 
accounts, they still help the politicians that they follow by two ways. Firstly, they 
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artificially inflate the number of followers a politician has making them possibly seem 
more popular than they actually are. Secondly, they help increase the visibility of 
politicians, since being followed by many promotes an account over other less popular 
accounts in Twitter’s who to follow suggestions. Consequently, bot accounts that are 
created for an entirely different purpose may unintentionally help politicians when they 
follow their accounts based on Twitter’s recommendations. Since Twitter’s 
recommendations are regional, this effect is more pronounced in an area like Finland that 
has a small population.  
The four main groups of bots which were introduced in the methodology section and 
that were inspected more closely in this thesis can be seen in Figure 8. The figure also 
illustrates how the groups overlap, as for example some of the Russian and Arabic bots 
have similar following patterns as bots from other groups.  
 
Figure 8. Venn digram describing four most common types of bots found in the dataset 
The first and largest group of bots are those that follow the Finnish paper 
Markkinointi & Mainonta. The group consists of 36838 bots and they represent 18% of all 
the accounts classified as bots by the model. There are several possible explanations for a 
seemingly random paper such as M&M attracting bots, which represent 49% of its 74937 
followers on Twitter. One is that the paper has ended up being among the accounts that 
Twitter often recommends when registering to the social media site from a Finnish IP 
address. The other theory is that the paper has purchased followers to improve its visibility 
and popularity on Twitter, but this would seem unlikely to happen in Finland due to the 
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beforementioned reasons. It can be assumed that these are simply unsophisticated bots that 
are either waiting to be activated for some future purpose or have already fulfilled their 
purpose as part of a follower farm. It is difficult if not impossible to categorize them as 
political or unpolitical with the information currently available. 
The second group is bots that are following 21 other accounts and there are 13609 of 
them. As explained by Patel (2018) the most probable explanation for the prevalence of 
bots with this characteristic is that they are programmed to follow all the twenty-one 
accounts that Twitter suggests upon creating a new account. Similar to the Markkinointi & 
Mainonta group, the bots in this group cannot be labeled as being political with the current 
amount of information. Furthermore, the fact that these accounts are most likely following 
accounts purely based on Twitter’s recommendation supports the theory that they are 
meant for something completely different and thus they do not intentionally influence 
Finnish politics.  
The third group consists of both accounts assumed to be originating from Russian or 
Arabic speaking countries. Originally these accounts were identified during the validation 
phase by the use of non-ASCII characters, which in this case is Arabic and Cyrillic writing. 
Currently there does not exist any highly accurate or easily usable library for determining 
whether or not characters in a string are Cyrillic or Arabic. Therefore, as a proxy for this 
the language setting of the Twitter account was used instead to query for these accounts. 
This gives us a very rough estimate as it ignores accounts with Russian and Arabic text 
that have a different language such as English in the settings. The group has 8235 accounts 
with Russian and 2802 with Arabic set as the language of Twitter. Based on the 
characteristics of the accounts, they can be mainly categorized as belonging to follower 
farms or as being spambots that are spreading varying content. 
The fourth and smallest group of bots are those that are following Growtopia 
Official, the Twitter page of an online game that has existed since 2013. These 2813 
accounts are unique when compared to the bots in other groups, since their purpose is clear 
as the creators have not put much effort into concealing it. The Growtopia bots not only 
boost the number of followers the page has, but also often have one or two tweets solely 
dedicated to promoting the game. An example of this behavior can be seen in Appendix D 
under the Twitter screen name kivilahti_miro. The reason why these bots end up following 
Finnish politicians is most likely the same as with the other groups, or in other words by 
coincidence and as a result of Twitter’s recommendation system.    
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Based on the network analysis, the modularity of the networks is low and thus there 
are only few clusters within the four different groups. With the current data it is not 
possible to determine whether or not these clusters actually have relevance or if they can 
be used in identifying bots that have been created by the same individual or organization. 
One possible reason for bot datasets being dividable into clusters is that Twitter’s 
suggestions on which accounts to follow changes periodically resulting in the bots 
following different politicians depending on their date of creation (Gallagher, 2018).  
5.1.2 The proposed bot detection model 
The bot detection model proposed in this thesis suggests that metadata alone is sufficient 
for classifying at least spambots and bots that belong to follower farms. However, the lack 
of more specific data on tweeting behavior and the contents of the tweets renders the 
model unable to accurately identify advanced social bots based on the 2000 accounts 
reviewed during the validation phase of the model building process.  
The primary benefit of a model based on metadata is that the data collection is much 
quicker as 90,000 accounts’ information can be retrieved every 15 minutes. Therefore, a 
model that uses metadata works particularly well when studying countries that have a 
small population, since then even the most popular Twitter users are likely to have a 
manageable number of followers when compared to global standards. In other words, due 
to the limited number of users in these countries, it is possible to gather comprehensive 
datasets for analysis in short periods of time. Furthermore, analyzing entire populations 
instead of samples is feasible with a purely metadata-based model, contrary to models that 
use tweet data, where the number of accounts to analyze is restricted by Twitter’s 
streaming API’s rate limits. 
Regarding the selection of the feature space and algorithm, most of the results were 
in line with the reviewed literature, although some of the results were surprising. Random 
forest was the optimal classification algorithm, which was the result in several other 
models as well (Fernquist et al., 2018). While ratio features had high feature importance as 
suggested by previous research, the binary features did not despite of their popularity in 
earlier models. Overall, the performance of the model was below most of those listed in the 
literature review, but as stated earlier direct comparison is difficult due to the differences in 
the goals of the models.  
As a more theoretical contribution, the framework in Figure 9 was developed. Based 
on the different steps of the research process during the thesis as well as the backgrounds 
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of other studies (Salge & Karahanna, 2018), it seems apparent that due to the vast variety 
and volume of Twitter data, interesting findings tend to be found as a byproduct of 
attempting to solve or find answers to an unrelated research question. In the case of this 
thesis, the original goal was to detect political bots, but due to the ambiguity of the results 
and lack of a clear presence as well as the surfacing of different types of bots the focus was 
pivoted to studying them instead of attempting to refine the model to answer the initial 
research question. 
 
Figure 9. Framework for building bot detection models 
The framework suggests that bot detection model research can and perhaps should be 
viewed as an iterative process where the problem being solved can be adjusted or changed 
dynamically based on interim results. Using this thesis as an example, in the first step the 
goal was set to finding evidence of political bots in the Finnish Twittersphere. To reach 
this goal the first version of the bot detection model was developed. After analyzing and 
validating the results produced by the first model, it was clear that the model did not work 
entirely as intended. However, it produced certain interesting findings as it managed to 
classify correctly a large number of bots that were then divided into four groups. Instead of 
proceeding to drawing conclusions, the goal was redefined, and the model redesigned as 
illustrated in the framework in steps 4a and 2. After analyzing the outcome of the second 
model, the findings were deemed strong enough to allow proceeding to the final step, 
which is drawing conclusions.  
5.2 Potential impact on Finnish political Twitter 
5.2.1 Overview 
The primary impact that the bots have on Finnish political Twitter is related to the 
visibility and perceivable popularity of the politicians’ accounts. Considering Twitter’s low 
utilization as a medium for political debate in Finland, the possible effects the bots may 
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validate results
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have had on voters can be considered negligible. Nevertheless, one metric for measuring a 
politician’s popularity that can be used to predict election results is how many followers 
they have on different platforms and how much their audience engages with them 
(DiGrazia et al., 2013). Therefore, even if the impact on actual voting behavior is minimal, 
the presence of bots may manipulate perceptions, influence predictions and damage the 
validity of social media engagement as an indicator of actual popularity. 
5.2.2 Empirical evidence 
Although at first glance the network graphs would suggest that the bots tend to form 
clusters around certain politicians, no correlation was found regarding party preference of 
the bots that belong to any of the four groups. This would imply that the politicians were 
followed most likely due to their presence in Twitter’s suggestions. This is further 
strengthened by the fact that the number of followers an account has correlates very 
strongly (0.97) with the number of bots. This suggests that there may be a vicious cycle 
where popular accounts are likely to attract increasing numbers of bot followers, thus 
further boosting their visibility at the expense of less followed politicians.  
Table 10 lists each of the fourteen politicians whose data was mined and shows how 
many bot followers from the four groups they have as well as the percentage of such bots 
in their follower base. It should be noted that this data represents a snapshot of the moment 
when the data was collected, which was in March 2019. Although the numbers are likely to 
have remained in the same magnitude, there may be some differences in the number of 
followers since an increased interest in politics and their Twitter profiles is expectable 
particularly during April, since the election date is on the 14th. Furthermore, Twitter 
removes accounts that it has identified as bots and this has already happened to some of the 
accounts belonging to the collected dataset.  
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Table 10: Percentage of bot* followers by politician 
Twitter Party Followers Bots Bot % 
@alexstubb National Coalition Party 370000 49096 13% 
@niinisto National Coalition Party 151000 13107 9% 
@juhasipila Centre Party 124000 19949 16% 
@AnneBerner Centre Party 21700 2791 13% 
@Haavisto Green League 128000 24507 19% 
@VilleNiinisto Green League 83100 13891 17% 
@paavoarhinmaki Left Alliance 108000 16989 16% 
@liandersson Left Alliance 73700 7136 10% 
@AnttiRinnepj Social Democratic Party 24000 2529 11% 
@MarinSanna Social Democratic Party 14300 1555 11% 
@Halla_aho Finns Party 11900 634 5% 
@LauraHuhtasaari Finns Party 12300 815 7% 
@SampoTerho Blue Reform 7000 903 13% 
@kokokansanpaavo Seven Star Movement 10000 1115 11% 
* Includes only bots that belong to the four groups. Percentages are higher if taking into consideration all potential bots 
 
When inspecting the scores of individual politicians, Pekka Haavisto had the highest 
percentage of bot followers in the sample, and the percentage is beyond Twitter’s own 
estimates of typical rates of bot followers. The strong bot presence in Haavisto’s Twitter 
follower base was subject to debate already in 2017 during his presidential election 
campaign (Yle, 2017). Previous analysis attributed the bot followers to be a result of a 
sudden increase in Growtopia bots and Twitter’s recommendations boosting Haavisto, 
which is similar to the findings of this thesis. 
The other notable example of a politician benefitting from the added visibility is 
Alexander Stubb who has acquired the largest absolute number of bot followers. Many of 
the bots were not following any other politicians besides Stubb, which is likely due to his 
strong presence in Twitter as the 3rd most followed account in Finland. This is clearly 
visible in the network graphs, where typically Stubb is the only politician to have a large 
and separate cluster of bot followers.  
Contrary to findings elsewhere (Schäfer et al., 2017; Morstatter et al. 2018), the 
candidates most likely to be linked to the Finnish alt-right movement Laura Huhtasaari and 
Jussi Halla-aho had the lowest percentage of bot followers. However, this is not surprising 
when taking into consideration the other findings and that they also have the lowest 
number of followers, which means that bots are less likely to follow them by coincidence.   
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6 Conclusions 
This chapter paraphrases the main implications, contribution and limitations of the thesis 
and provides suggestions for further research.   
6.1 Implications 
The main implications of the thesis are that there is no clear evidence of Twitter being used 
as a platform for influencing Finnish politics during the 2019 parliamentary election and 
while a significant portion of the Finnish Twittersphere consists of bots, they are possibly 
non-political by nature. The bots can be described as malicious rather than benign and 
many of them are either dormant and waiting for activation or abandoned for having 
already completed their purpose. Furthermore, it is evident that Twitter’s official estimates 
on the share of bot users are too conservative at least based on the data used in the thesis.  
6.2 Contributions 
The thesis has both practical and theoretical contributions to Twitter related research and 
the development of bot detection algorithms. The primary practical contribution is the bot 
detection model itself, which adds to the existing knowledge of how well metadata-based 
models can perform. Furthermore, it can be implemented in its current form or built upon 
in future research.  
The development of the bot detection algorithm resulted in an unintentional, but 
additional methodological contribution for the development of future bot detection models, 
as a high quality and accurately labeled training dataset was created. Datasets with 
accurately classified Twitter accounts are not abundant and they lose value as they age due 
to the constant development of bots. If the dataset is accepted to the bot repository of 
Indiana University Network Science Institute, a portal which stores and distributes datasets 
and tools related to bot research, or otherwise shared online, it can be utilized in future 
research.  
The theoretical contributions are the two qualitative frameworks used in the thesis. 
The first framework described the process used to qualitatively classify accounts as bots or 
humans and was introduced in the methodology chapter in Figure 3. Although currently is 
designed specifically for the dataset used in this thesis, with minor alterations it can be 
used in other contexts as well. The second framework is a higher-level and more 
conceptual tool for building bot detection models. It is used in the findings chapter and 
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shown in Figure 9. The purpose of the framework is to propose an iterative and more open-
ended approach to bot detection research.  
6.3 Limitations 
The limitations of this research are primarily related to methodology. More specifically, 
the approach used in the selection of politicians and data collection phase as well as choice 
of features in the machine learning model introduced some constraints to the analyses that 
could be performed. Although it was possible to determine if an account is a bot based on 
metadata, the collected data did not enable examining the content that they interacted with 
or spread via tweets, retweets and likes. Therefore, one of the major limitations is that the 
data collection method employed in this thesis allows only determining the number of bot 
followers that the selected politicians have and based on that estimating if the botnets are 
supporting certain parties or candidates. However, the impact of this was significantly 
reduced by the findings of the thesis, which suggest that a most of the bots detected are not 
actively creating or distributing content. Lastly, there is a limitation related to the selection 
of politicians. It is possible that politicians with much higher or lower percentages of bot 
followers may have been omitted from the sample.  
6.4 Suggestions for further research 
6.4.1 Future elections 
In order to further understand the use of bots in the Finnish Twittersphere, the model could 
be reused during the upcoming 2019 European Parliament election by collecting a new 
dataset. This would be particularly interesting due to the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service’s suggestion that the EU elections are likely to be a more attractive target for 
external influencing attempts than the Finnish parliamentary election (Simojoki, 2019). 
6.4.2 Model development 
The amount of testing and adjustments made to the model during the thesis was limited. 
Therefore, additional research could help identify new and more powerful features and 
thus improve the model, providing further support for metadata-based models. By 
introducing new features and testing alternative classification algorithms with different 
parameters, it is likely that all key performance metrics such as accuracy and recall could 
be improved and results closer to the models discussed in the literature review achieved.  
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6.4.3 Development of the botnet 
To analyze the efficiency of Twitter’s own bot detection and removal practices, the rate at 
which accounts labeled as bots get removed from the social media site can be followed. In 
addition, changes in the activity of the bots can be monitored by inspecting how the 
attributes such as number of tweets and likes changes overtime. Especially interesting 
would be to find evidence if some of the accounts were sleeper bots waiting for activation.  
6.5 Summary 
The goals of this thesis were to investigate if Twitter bots were used to influence the 2019 
Finnish parliamentary election and to test a new approach to Twitter bot detection. In the 
thesis a new supervised machine learning bot detection model was developed and then 
used to determine the number of bot followers that a sample of the most popular Finnish 
politicians have in their follower base. To study the networks that the bots form more 
closely as well as to highlight certain interesting characteristics of these botnets, more in-
depth analysis was conducted on four smaller groups of bots.  
The dataset used in the thesis consisted of 550,000 unique accounts out of which 
roughly 169,600 were potentially bots according to the model’s predictions. The metadata-
based model was found to be feasible for classifying bots on Twitter and the predictions of 
the model were used to assess if bots were utilized during the 2019 Finnish parliamentary 
election. Based on the findings it was concluded that there was no evidence of attempts to 
influence the elections with Twitter bots. Although the bots increased the visibility of some 
politicians and made them seem more popular, the bots are unlikely to have had much 
effect due to their passive behavior coupled with the low usage of Twitter in Finland.  
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Appendix A: Twitter data mining script 
 
 
Full script available at: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=19pCe5mLat9L34BqJznoYPk5aBVQW683i 
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Appendix C: Examples of bots detected by the model 
@JarmoPikkuaho is an account in the M&M and following 21 accounts groups. 
 
 
@iDqWp12KJ4RA3Fg and @oL3Oe5OxNFJ86tL are accounts belonging to the group of 
foreign language bots. 
 
 
 
 
@kivilahti_miro is an account in the group of Growtopia bots.  
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Appendix D: Network graphs 
The following link leads to higher resolution online version of the network graphs where 
the account names are readable:  
 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1Vao2JneZHU5lTNulZmGgqG1QDLaz7Fzp  
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Full script available at: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=19pCe5mLat9L34BqJznoYPk5aBVQW683i 
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